Europe in a multipolar world by Martill, Benjamin & Ten Brinke, Lisa
Benjamin Martill 
Lisa ten Brinke
STRATEGIC UPDATE
JUNE 2020
Europe in a 
 Multipolar World
LSE IDEAS is LSE’s foreign policy  
think tank. Ranked #1 university affiliated 
think tank in the world in the 2019 
Global Go To Think Tank Index.
 
We connect academic knowledge of diplomacy  
and strategy with the people who use it. 
‘‘
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD | Benjamin Martill and Lisa ten Brinke 3
Power is diffusing from West to East and non-democratic powers are among those rising fastest. These changes have been in the offing 
for decades, but their effects are now increasingly 
manifest. Where does Europe stand within this 
emerging multipolar order? Is there a European 
‘pole’ in the international system, and—if so—what 
is its contribution to the emerging order? These are 
important questions at the forefront of policymakers’ 
minds. This Strategic Update examines in more detail 
the position of Europe—and the EU—in a multipolar 
world. We argue that Europe’s presence on the global 
stage is limited by a number of significant challenges, 
including institutional deficiencies, divergence in 
strategic cultures, values unconducive to power 
politics, and limitations in capabilities, not to mention 
Brexit. Finding ways to overcome each of these 
challenges, we argue, is imperative if Europe wishes 
to protect its interests and avoid being sidelined 
in the coming decades. And it is important for 
international order, too, since a strengthened Europe 
could contribute to a more stable multipolarity in a 
number of respects, not least by facilitating more fluid 
balancing dynamics, diluting perceptions of Western 
aggression, promoting regional cooperation, and 
strengthening institutions necessary for regulating 
international order.
Europe must 
get used to 
these new 
dynamics of 
world politics  
whilst making 
sure it has  
a stake in  
the game. 
‘‘
‘‘
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update  |  June 20204
Our argument proceeds as follows. We first 
consider the changing nature of international 
order and the rise of multipolarity, setting out 
the changes this involves, the implications for 
global stability, and the likely consequences 
for Europe. We then present the principal 
factors limiting the establishment of a 
European ‘pole’ within this system, focusing 
on institutions, strategic culture, capabilities, 
and values, before discussing the challenge 
of Brexit. Finally, we explore what contribution 
a European pole could make to the stability of 
the emerging multipolar system, suggesting 
a strong and unified Europe could hedge 
against American domination of the West, 
promote regionalisation and region-to-region 
cooperation, provide for a more fluid balance 
of power, and increase trust in the system 
through its perception as a more neutral 
actor without hegemonic interests.
A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
The world is becoming more multipolar as 
power diffuses gradually and as a host of 
formerly regional powers have begun to set 
out their designs on the international system. 
A number of countries, including China and 
India, have developed extraordinarily rapidly 
on the back of the American-led liberal 
international order. China has done so with 
the aid of a strong-state which has—contrary 
to Washington Consensus thinking—allowed 
the regime to bolster its productivity and thus 
its economic (if not political) development. 
Other countries, such as South Africa, 
Brazil and Turkey, have become regional 
power centres in their own right and have 
clamoured for greater global influence as 
a result, often representing their regions in 
international forums. Russia, for its part, has 
not only moved a long way from its previous 
embrace of democratic norms in recent 
years, but it has also increasingly sought 
to articulate a more forceful philosophy of 
international affairs.
Whether multipolar dynamics make for a 
more or less stable international system 
remains an open question. Multipolar 
systems may seem unstable in some 
respects: Alliance patterns are more fluid and 
prone to swifter change, coordination is more 
difficult, institutions are correspondingly 
harder to maintain, and the presence of 
diverse worldviews allows for a near endless 
multiplicity of fault lines of conflict.1 But 
corresponding stabilising features can 
also be identified: The greater diffusion of 
interests undermines the ability of states to 
achieve political or ideological hegemony, 
thereby increasing the need for genuinely 
multilateral institutional forums and 
diplomatic norms, and promoting balancing 
dynamics which may increase the leverage 
of smaller actors in the system. The increase 
in the number of potential conflicts also 
makes individual conflicts less salient, since 
divergence on fundamental issues becomes 
a fact of life rather than an existential 
challenge. As with other international orders, 
it will be a long-time until the dynamics of 
multipolarity become evident. But—stable or 
unstable—these dynamics are different from 
those that have gone before.
Multipolarity is a game-changer for Europe, 
which has enjoyed a comfortable position 
as junior partner to the United States (US) 
in the decades since the end of the Second 
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World War. Historically, Europe has been afforded 
the luxury of muddling through because it has been 
under the explicit protection of the American ‘security 
umbrella’ through NATO. And, of course, Europe was 
spared complex political and ethical choices by the 
dominance of liberal-democratic norms—especially 
after the end of the Cold War—since this allowed 
normative and strategic goals to go hand-in-hand. 
It must now confront a world in which power is 
becoming more important as a currency, in which 
disengagement is likely to increasingly characterise 
the US position on European security, and in which 
complex moral choices return to the forefront of 
strategic and diplomatic decisions. Europe must get 
used to these new dynamics of world politics whilst 
making sure it has a stake in the game. And it must 
confront new challenges and trade-offs which may sit 
poorly against past experience.
To achieve this, Europeans will need to overcome a 
number of long-standing challenges to the articulation 
of a strong—and coherent—European voice in world 
politics.
THE CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE
One challenge is the absence of pan-European 
institutional frameworks able to coordinate effective 
and coherent foreign, security and defence policies. 
Since the demise of proposals for a European 
Defence Community in 1954, the continent had relied 
upon NATO for its security. Proposals for indigenous 
European initiatives have been many, but have been 
comparatively modest. The EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), for instance, has focused 
primarily on low-risk and politically acceptable 
missions in Europe’s near abroad, not least because 
of concerns about burden sharing and effectiveness. 
Minilateral and bilateral formats and initiatives are the 
order of the day and, while more flexible, these lack 
Even though  
Europeans are 
spending more  
on defence, they  
are not necessarily 
spending it  
together, in the 
right ways, and 
on the most  
appropriate  
projects.
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mechanisms for coordination, and frequently 
exclude key players. Recent initiatives, such 
as the launch of Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) and proposals for a 
‘European Intervention Initiative’, show that 
Europe is taking the challenge seriously, but 
also that institutional duplication remains a 
major issue. In the absence of institutions 
facilitating (rapid) collective decisions on 
delicate matters of foreign and security 
policy, Europe will always lag behind.
Divergences in what is often termed 
‘strategic culture’—predispositions countries 
have towards security and defence issues—
also afflict European countries and hamper 
close cooperation between them in foreign 
affairs. Some countries, such as Britain 
and France, seek to eke out a global role for 
themselves, while others, such as Germany, 
are less keen to do so. A number of countries 
seek to preserve the Atlantic security 
system, while others—chief among them 
France—have sought European alternatives. 
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
have an understandable preoccupation 
with territorial defence, while their Southern 
European neighbours are more concerned 
with maritime security. Britain and France, 
for their part, have focused on the ability 
to deploy expeditionary forces, not least 
in order to manage crises in parts of the 
world where they are the former colonising 
powers. The upshot of these differences is 
that Europe is an ‘astrategic actor’ which is 
not predisposed—or perhaps even able—
to agree upon common goals or to devise 
the means to achieve these.2 European 
countries notably failed to agree a common 
line on the invasion of Iraq in 2003, on how 
to deal with the Libya crisis in 2011, and they 
differ at present on deterring Russia and 
dealing with the fallout from the collapse of 
the Iran nuclear deal.
Then there is the question of values, and 
whether the dominant value sets in Europe 
are suited to a potentially more dangerous 
world. The EU, for instance, regards 
itself as a champion of ‘civilian’ values—
peace, diplomacy, multilateralism—and 
normative goals, including the promotion 
of democracy and human rights.3 It is also 
a vanguardist project, aimed at the creation 
of an international order based on the rule 
of law, regional cooperation, and peaceful 
relations between states. Whether these 
values stem from Europe’s violent history, 
or its relative weakness in military terms, 
is an open question. These values are 
laudable, but they may not be wholly suited 
to the realities of multipolar politics. For one 
thing, normative goals are more difficult to 
achieve in an international order marked by 
competing views of political order. Moreover, 
civilian values undergird the reluctance of 
both the EU and a number of member states 
to address shortfalls in defence capabilities. 
The 2016 Global Strategy recognises this 
problem and aims to inculcate changes in 
the Union’s values which would facilitate 
greater strategic actorness, including 
attempts to break-down the taboo of 
‘hard power’ and to introduce ‘principled 
pragmatism’ as a bridge between the EU’s 
interests and its ‘post-Westphalian’ values.
There is also the question of capabilities. 
European states have only recently begun 
to arrest the decline in defence spending 
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which was the (inevitable) consequence of the 
end of the Cold War, and which was exacerbated in 
recent years by the financial crisis and the resulting 
implementation of austerity policies across the 
continent. To be fair, the countries of Europe—and 
the member states of the EU—together possess 
significant military capabilities. Moreover, as 
wealthy, industrialised countries they are also 
endowed with not insignificant ‘latent capabilities’, 
or the ability to translate resources into capabilities 
should the need arise. But shortfalls persist. 
European countries have notable deficiencies in 
strategic airlift, for instance, and this is one area 
where they rely significantly on the Americans. 
Meanwhile, defence procurement itself suffers from 
a lack of coordination, problems of duplication, 
issues with interoperability, and limitations which 
stem from the absence of an indigenous European 
defence-industrial base. Even though Europeans are 
spending more on defence, they are not necessarily 
spending it together, in the right ways, and on the 
most appropriate projects. While PESCO may help 
in this regard, it is no panacea.
AND THEN THERE’S BREXIT…
How Brexit factors into this picture is complex. 
In strategic terms, it is not clear the damage will 
be insurmountable, since European security is 
intergovernmental, since NATO is the prime security 
and defence actor, and since the commonality of 
interests on both sides is likely to remain intact. 
There are also some enabling factors, not least 
the removal of the ‘British veto’ over security and 
defence initiatives. Economically, the impact may 
well be more significant, since Brexit risks the 
UK undercutting EU standards as a spoiler from 
outside, and since Britain represents the loss of 
one-sixth of the EU’s combined GDP. Brexit comes 
with challenges for the EU’s legitimacy also, since it 
Brexit is a wild 
card. But it does 
not herald the 
imminent break-up 
of the Union, nor 
does it obviate the 
pressures pushing 
the EU in a more 
‘strategic’ direction.
‘‘
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does not look good to have an important member state 
leave. The EU itself is well aware of this, which partly 
explains why it has driven such a hard bargain in the 
negotiations, seeking to see the UK demonstrably lose 
from its decision to withdraw. The existential nature 
of the Brexit challenge has also resulted in greater 
unity among the remaining EU27, as well as increased 
recognition among more recalcitrant member states as 
to the benefits of membership. Even populist parties 
have toned down their messages in the wake of Brexit.4
To be sure, the politics of Brexit will create problems 
for a few years. The negotiations have pitted both sides 
against each other in a manner which precludes easy 
compromises on a number of issues. And institutional 
quibbles may preclude UK participation in EU security 
initiatives in the short term, although in the long term 
the EU has an advantage keeping the Brits ‘plugged 
in’,5 given what the UK can bring to the table in this 
regard. Both sides also have political incentives to 
demonstrate successful divergence from one another, 
which is one reason why politicians on both sides of 
the channel have cited such phrases as ‘Global Britain’ 
and ‘strategic autonomy’ with gusto in the past few 
years. But these political dynamics are unlikely to 
erode the underlying strategic (and economic) drivers 
for closer collaboration and will likely peter out as 
the divorce process nears completion. Ultimately, the 
commonality of interests and the fierceness of the 
strategic imperatives facing both Britain and the EU27 
—Russian aggression, American disengagement, 
Chinese ascension etc.—will likely outweigh the 
shorter-term political and institutional conflicts which 
have characterised the Brexit process to-date.
Brexit is a wild card. But it does not herald the imminent 
break-up of the Union, nor does it obviate the pressures 
pushing the EU in a more ‘strategic’ direction. To some 
extent, Brexit has proven a driver in this regard. First, 
because British opposition to the EU becoming more 
of a security and defence actor has receded. Second, 
A strong European 
‘pole’ can not only 
help the Europeans 
to realise their 
interests on the 
global stage but 
can also contribute 
to a more stable 
multipolar order. 
‘‘
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because Brexit has provided a moment of 
necessary reflection on the future of the 
European project. Third, because Brexit has 
galvanised the EU27 into greater unity of 
purpose than previously imagined. Finally, 
because the EU has incentives to breathe 
fresh life into the integration project to show 
it remains viable, and nowhere is there more 
to be done than in security and defence. This 
is not to say that European policymakers 
can get ahead of themselves. Ambitions 
are still not matched by capabilities. And 
not all member states are on-board with 
further integration. But it is certainly not 
the case that Brexit wholly undermines the 
efforts of the European countries to become 
more coherent, and more powerful, on 
the world stage.
EUROPE AS A  
MULTIPOLAR STABILISER
Thus far we’ve listed the challenges Europe 
faces in articulating its diverse preferences 
in a coherent manner on the international 
stage. Put simply, Europe lacks the 
actorness, capabilities, common goals, and 
values conducive to the pursuit of interests. 
All this is changing, slowly. The Global 
Strategy and the host of recent institutional 
developments in the EU aim to overcome 
each of these problems. But progress needs 
to be more meaningful if the EU wishes to 
develop an effective response to a changing 
international order. What is at stake for 
Europeans is the ability to articulate their 
interests and values on the world stage, 
and to defend these when they come under 
attack. If Europe does not work on fostering 
institutions and a collective strategic culture 
capable of buttressing its preferences, it will 
lose out in the longer-term.
And an enfeebled Europe might not be a good 
thing for international order either, since 
there is much that a European ‘pole’ could 
bring to the table when it comes to promoting 
multipolar stability. The EU is a champion 
of both regional integration and region-to-
region cooperation, which will become ever 
more crucial channels of interlocution in a 
world characterised by regional hegemons 
and their global interaction. The EU is also 
a key supporter of institutionalisation—of 
which it is itself one of the most successful 
global examples—and the defence of the 
existing framework of international order, 
the precarity of which is decried ever more 
frequently. A stronger Europe would also 
provide a useful counterweight to American 
dominance within the West, preventing more 
conflictual US preferences from defining 
the Western position, and undermining the 
view from the outside that the West is an 
indivisible (and threatening) bloc.6 The EU 
may also be able to inspire greater trust in 
other actors, since it is perceptibly a more 
‘neutral’ actor than the US, as well as being 
an avowedly regional actor with limited 
global designs (save for the nature of the 
institutions regulating international order). 
And the EU may well prove better adapted 
to the pluralism of the emerging multipolar 
world: Dealing with difference is in the EU’s 
DNA, after all, and European countries have 
historically been more open to compromise 
and negotiation with non-democracies 
than has the US.
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A strong European ‘pole’ can not only help 
the Europeans to realise their interests on 
the global stage but can also contribute to 
a more stable multipolar order. This requires 
not only the building-up of actorness and 
joint-capabilities, but also a number of 
careful balancing acts.  It means tapping 
into a more ‘realist’—but not aggressive—
tradition of foreign policymaking and 
becoming more sensitive to the balance 
of global power and the limits of what is 
practically achievable, and less sensitive 
to the particular characteristics of would-
be global allies. It also means balancing 
clashing normative commitments, such 
as the imperatives of global order and the 
promotion of liberal worldviews abroad.
This may be a lot for Europeans to stomach, 
although they might not have much of a 
choice in the matter. It is not so much about 
jettisoning the ideal of being a normative 
power, but rather qualifying what is possible, 
and recognising that normativity points 
in a multitude of potentially incompatible 
directions (order vs. justice, for instance). It 
requires a balance between the development 
of greater capabilities and ‘actorness’, and 
the eschewing of the trappings of power, 
so often associated with the jettisoning of 
normative commitments. In other words, 
Europe cannot lose sight of its multilateral 
commitments, but it needs to learn to play 
the power politics game too. And Europeans 
need to recognise that their own standards 
cannot simply be exported around the 
globe. In short, Europe must be humble 
when it comes to setting the scope of its 
desired influence.
CONCLUSION: A EUROPEAN POLE?
Europe finds itself ill-prepared to thrive in 
the more complex, plural and potentially 
dangerous multipolar world. Its institutions 
do not permit the necessary levels of 
coordination for us to speak of a strong, 
unified European pole, nor do its present 
capability levels or dominant values lend 
themselves to the emergence of Europe as 
a strategic actor.
The direction-of-travel at the EU level is 
progressing, but slowly. Recent institutional 
developments and discursive changes 
are to be welcomed but will need to be 
complemented by greater ambition and 
demonstrated usage by member states. And 
the thorny question of how these institutions 
can involve non-EU members is, especially 
since Brexit, of particular significance.
Making these changes is not only a way 
of safeguarding European values against 
threats, but also of contributing to a 
more stable multipolar world. Europeans 
can contribute to this by preventing the 
solidification of the ‘Western’ bloc, ensuring 
a more fluid balance of power, helping 
to ground institutional structures and 
practices, and bolstering region-to-region 
cooperation. In order to do this, however, 
they need to be realistic and jettison the 
aversion to power politics prevalent in many 
parts of the continent.
If Europe can get its act together, it is not just 
Europeans who will benefit.
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Multipolarity is a game-changer for Europe. Faced with 
a disengaged US, European policymakers are forced to 
shape their own response to new, multipolar dynamics.
Europe will need to overcome a host of internal 
challenges, including institutional deficiencies, 
divergence in strategic cultures, values unconducive 
to power politics, and limited capabilities.
While Brexit creates short-term political conflict, it is 
unlikely to undermine longer-term European efforts to 
become more powerful and coherent on the world stage.
A strong European ‘pole’ will not only help the Europeans 
to realise their interests on the global stage but can 
also contribute to a more stable multipolar order.
A strengthened Europe could support a stable multipolarity 
by facilitating fluid balancing, diluting perceptions of 
Western aggression, promoting regional cooperation, 
and strengthening international institutions.
This will require Europe to balance between a 
more ‘realist’ approach and clashing normative 
commitments, and between greater capabilities 
and its commitment to multilateralism.
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